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Abstract 
Research on the mental representation of negated concepts in written texts has yet to 
reach a consensus about the effects of negation. MacDonald and Just (1989) reported that 
after reading a sentence with a negation, negated words took longer to recognize than 
non-negated words, which suggests that the negated concepts became less active. 
However, Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) found that after reading negative metaphors 
(e.g., this surgeon isn’t a butcher), lexical decisions about words consistent with the 
affirmative sense of the negated word (e.g., clumsy) took less time than for control words. 
To reconcile these (and other) incompatible findings, two experiments were conducted to 
test the possibility that the findings of MacDonald and Just do not persist beyond 
immediate testing. Experiment 1 used a probe task and materials similar to those used by 
MacDonald and Just, with the addition that the probe task occurred either 0 ms, 500 ms, 
or 1000 ms after the end of the sentence. The negation effect was present at 0 ms, 
replicating MacDonald and Just, but not at 500 ms or 1000 ms. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the reduced activation seen from negation out of context is short-
lived. Experiment 2 used an eye-tracking procedure to provide converging evidence for 
the effect of additional processing time. However, the hypotheses were not supported. 
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Reactivation of Negated Concepts over Time 
Language is an indispensable part of what makes us human. Unlike animal 
communication, which is rooted in non-symbolic signs, human language abstracts 
thought into symbols that can be combined into an infinite number of utterances. This 
allows us to communicate about abstract concepts as well as things that have never 
occurred or could never occur. It frees us from discussing the immediate environment, 
allowing us to communicate about the past and future just as easily as the present. Where 
once people were bound by what they could discover in a single lifetime, language made 
it possible for information to be transmitted across time, enabling people to benefit from 
those who came before them.  
For most of human history, language was exclusively spoken. But once writing 
was invented, this important tool quickly spread across the world. With a modern 
worldwide literacy rate around 82% (CIA Factbook, 2010), reading and writing are an 
integral part of daily life for the majority of modern humans. And although language 
comes naturally and with seemingly minimal effort, its usefulness is rivaled only by its 
complexity.  
Comprehension of a written text involves the construction of a mental 
representation of the described state of affairs (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan, 
Radvansky, Hilliard, & Curiel, 1998). This mental representation includes information 
previously presented in the text as well as general knowledge about the world. 
Importantly, this representation is constantly evolving, with new information being 
integrated either by adding to the representation if the new information is consistent, or 
by altering the representation if the new information is inconsistent.  
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It is fairly intuitive how information about the presence of some object or attribute 
would be integrated into a mental representation; however, it is much less clear how the 
mental representation would incorporate the absence of objects or attributes, as is the case 
when a text contains negation either explicitly (e.g. not, never) or implicitly (e.g. forget, 
ignore). In fact, there are several logical possibilities for how a negated concept is 
included in the mental representation: (1) it is represented as if it were present, (2) it is 
represented as if it were present and then suppressed, (3) it is never represented as if it 
were present and is instead immediately suppressed, or (4) it is never represented. 
Research on the processing of negation has produced inconsistent results regarding these 
possibilities, and as such, no overarching theory of negation processing exists. What 
follows is a review of some of these disparate findings. 
Much of the research on the processing of negation suggests that when a word in 
a sentence is negated, people are slower to recognize it after reading the sentence 
compared to a sentence in which the same word is not negated (Kaup, 2001; Kaup & 
Zwaan, 2003; MacDonald & Just, 1989). MacDonald and Just provided subjects with 
sentences in which either the first direct object was negated (1 above), the second direct 
object was negated (2), or there was no negation (3). They then used a probe recognition  
(1) Almost every weekend, Elizabeth bakes no bread but only cookies. 
(2) Almost every weekend, Elizabeth bakes some bread but no cookies. 
(3) Almost every weekend, Elizabeth bakes some bread and some cookies. 
task to measure the activation level of the representation of the negated and non-negated 
direct objects. This task involved the subjects being presented with a word and indicating 
whether or not it had occurred in the previous sentence. They found that subjects were 
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slower to recognize the probe words if they had been negated than if they had not been 
negated in the sentence. The increased time necessary to recognize a negated word is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the negated concept had been suppressed in the mental 
representation of the sentence. This would make it less active than a non-negated word 
and therefore in need of more time for processing. However, based on these findings it is 
unclear whether the negated concept is ever represented as present.  
Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) also provided evidence that a suppression process 
is occurring for negated concepts. Subjects saw affirmative (4) and negative metaphors 
(5) and responded to a lexical decision task in which subjects had to decide whether letter 
 (4) The kindergarten is a zoo.  
 (5) The kindergarten is not a zoo.  
strings were words or not. For critical trials, the strings were words related to the 
meaning of either the affirmative metaphor (e.g. noisy) or negative metaphor (e.g. calm). 
The lexical decision task was presented either 150, 500, or 1000 ms after the metaphor 
was read. For the lexical decisions occurring 150 and 500 ms after the metaphor, the 
affirmative meaning of the sentence was facilitated by both the affirmative and negative 
metaphors, relative to an unrelated control metaphor. However, for the lexical decisions 
occurring 1000 ms after the metaphor, the negated metaphors no longer facilitated 
responding to the affirmative meaning. These results show that initially (150 and 500 
ms), negated concepts are represented as if present. It is only after enough time has 
passed for processing to occur (1000 ms) that the negated concepts show evidence of 
suppression, consistent with the idea that negated concepts are represented as present and 
then suppressed.  
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While it may be true that under certain conditions negated entities are suppressed 
in the reader’s mental representation, there is also evidence that under some conditions 
negated entities continue to be represented as present over time and do not show signs of 
suppression. Kaup (2001) presented subjects with sentences containing negation that used 
either a verb of creation (6) or a verb of destruction (7). She found that subjects  
(6) John does not build the church but the castle.  
(7) Elizabeth does not burn the photographs but the letters.  
responded slower to negated concepts than non-negated concepts on a probe task for 
sentences containing verbs of creation, but when a sentence contained a verb of 
destruction (e.g., burn), negation no longer reduced the accessibility of the negated 
concept. Because the photographs were not destroyed, they should be represented as 
present despite having been negated, as is appropriate for the assertion of the example 
sentence in this case.  
There is also evidence that negated entities are considered during anaphor 
resolution (Levine & Hagaman, 2008). In this experiment, subjects read sentences like 
(8) followed by (9). After reading a large number of passages like these and completing 
 (8) Joe bought a mango but not a pineapple. 
 (9) He ate the fruit in his kitchen. 
a distracter task, subjects were given a surprise cued-recall task. Subjects were first asked 
“You read about two kinds of fruit—what was one of them?” followed by “You read 
about two kinds of fruit—what was the other?” Both negated and non-negated entities 
were recalled at a higher rate than a baseline that did not have a sentence like (9), with no 
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difference between the two. The fact that the negated concepts were just as active as the 
non-negated concepts suggests that suppression did not occur.  
These incompatible results highlight our incomplete knowledge of how negated 
concepts are mentally represented. Both MacDonald and Just (1989) and Kaup (2001) 
find evidence of early suppression of negated concepts when sentences contained verbs 
of creation in which the negation signaled the absence of the concept. Hasson and 
Glucksberg (2006) also found evidence of suppression, but not until 1000 ms after the 
sentence. On the other hand, Kaup (2001) showed that suppression of negated concepts 
does not occur when the sentences contained verbs of destruction, and Levine and 
Hagaman (2008) showed that negated concepts continue to serve as possible antecedents 
for anaphors. Thus it appears that negated entities can either be represented as present or 
suppressed in the mental representation of the sentence, depending on specific features of 
the negation (e.g., verbs of creation/destruction, metaphors, etc.). Therefore, two new 
experiments were conducted to test an overarching explanation for these disparate 
findings. 
The present experiments were designed to investigate if the results of MacDonald 
and Just (1989), which showed that negated concepts took longer to recognize than non-
negated concepts, can be explained by the fact that the negation in the sentences was 
unlicensed, meaning that the preceding context provided no need for the negation. Take, 
for example, the isolated sentence “Carol made a cake but not a pie.” The mention of pie 
here is unnecessary here because the sentence “Carol made a cake” already licenses the 
inference that she (probably) did not make pie, nor anything else other than cake. The 
addition of “but not a pie” only becomes necessary if, prior to the sentence, there was the 
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expectation that Carol would make a pie, in which case the preceding context would have 
licensed the negation.  
Unlicensed negation is difficult to process (Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen, & 
Johnson-Glenberg, 1999) in part because it is a violation of Grice’s (1975) conversational 
maxims. These four maxims, which are based on the assumption that all parties involved 
in a conversation accept a common purpose or direction for the conversation, are as 
follows: (1) The maxim of quantity—make your contributions to the conversation as 
informative as necessary and do not make your contributions to the conversation more 
informative than necessary; (2) the maxim of quality—do not say what you believe to be 
false and do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence; (3) the maxim of 
relevance—be relevant to the current topic of the conversation; and (4) the maxim of 
manner— avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief, and be orderly. 
Although Grice originally constructed these maxims to explain spoken language, it is 
reasonable to assume that they also extend to written language because in some sense the 
writer is “conversing” with the reader.  
Unlicensed negation violates both the maxims of quantity and relevance because 
it makes a sentence overly informative by adding irrelevant information. The violation of 
a maxim leads the reader to generate an implicature, which is an explanation for why the 
maxim was violated (Grice, 1975). A violation of one of the conversational maxims is not 
always an error. For instance, metaphors (e.g. John has a big head) can be understood in 
two ways: either (a) literally, meaning John’s head is large, or (b) figuratively, meaning 
John has a large ego. When used figuratively, the size of John’s head appears irrelevant 
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until one computes the implicature that the sentence was a metaphor. Importantly, this 
implicature must be understood for the sentence to be comprehended properly. 
Comprehending a sentence involves comparing the current sentence’s 
presuppositions with information already in the mental representation, and testing for 
consistency between the two. Every sentence presupposes some information and it is 
easier to test for consistency between the presuppositions and the mental representation 
when the presuppositions are explicitly stated. The sentence “Carol baked a cake but not 
a pie” presupposes that there was some reason to believe she was going to bake a pie. 
Presented out of context, this presupposition is never explicitly stated, which makes the 
negation unlicensed. Because of this, the reader must construct a presupposition that 
licenses the negation. Once a valid presupposition has been constructed, it then 
retroactively licenses the mention, and negation, of pie.  
It is this additional processing necessary for the construction of a presupposition 
that may account for the divergent results of previous studies. But before discussing how 
this processing may affect the activation of the negated concepts, it is necessary to take a 
look at the timing of presuppositional processing.  
The Given-New strategy (Haviland & Clark, 1974) was an early attempt to 
explain how information is integrated into a mental representation of an evolving 
discourse. This strategy proposes that people first identify the given information in a 
sentence (i.e., what is presupposed) and compare it to the existing mental representation 
of the preceding discourse, deciding whether or not they are consistent, and that only 
after this will they alter the model to accommodate the new information (i.e., what is 
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asserted). To test this hypothesis, Haviland and Clark had subjects read pairs of sentences 
in which (10a) or (10b) provided context for (11). Sentence (11) made reference to the  
(10a) We got some beer out of the trunk. 
(10b) We checked some picnic supplies. 
(11) The beer was warm. 
direct object in the first sentence using a definite noun phrase (NP), which is usually a 
marker of things that are presupposed. Half of the first sentences contained direct 
antecedents like in (10a), such that the word “beer” occurred in both sentences, while the 
other half contained indirect antecedents like in (10b), such that the word “beer” was 
present only in the second sentence. Sentence (11), which presupposes the existence of 
the beer, was read faster when the presupposition was explicitly provided in the first 
sentence by the direct antecedent pair (10a) than when the presupposition was implicitly 
provided in the indirect antecedent pair (10b).  
This finding suggests that the need to infer a presupposition slows 
comprehension; however, it does not explicitly test the temporal order of integration into 
the representation. Because of this limitation, Haviland and Clark (1974) acknowledged 
the inverse possibility for how information is integrated into a representation: the New-
Given strategy. This perspective assumes that readers initially take the truth of 
presuppositions for granted and therefore focus first on the new information in the 
sentence to comprehend what is asserted. After processing assertions, if they then have 
the time and motivation, readers will compare presuppositions to the mental 
representation.  
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In support of this New-Given strategy, Hornby (1974) provided initial evidence 
that presupposition processing occurs later than assertion processing. Subjects read 
sentences like “The girl is petting the cat.” This particular sentence presupposes the 
existence of both the girl and the cat and asserts the girl’s action of petting the cat. After 
reading, subjects verified whether or not a presented picture matched the sentence. Of the 
mismatched pictures, the inconsistency was sometimes with the sentence’s 
presupposition, for instance showing a boy petting the cat, and sometimes with its 
assertion, for instance showing the girl petting a dog. Subjects made more errors when 
the pictures were inconsistent with the presupposition than when they were inconsistent 
with the assertion. Accuracy in responding to the pictures should be a function of whether 
the processing of the inconsistent component has been completed. Therefore, the more-
accurate responding to the assertion-inconsistent pictures suggests that assertion 
processing was complete by the time the picture was presented, while the less-accurate 
responding to the presupposition-inconsistent pictures suggests that presupposition 
processing was not yet complete when the picture was presented. Because the pictures 
were presented at the same time regardless of the type of inconsistency, these results 
support the hypothesis that assertions are processed before presuppositions.  
A more direct test of the New-Given strategy was provided by Langford and 
Holmes (1979). In this study, subjects completed a paragraph-sentence verification task. 
Subjects read one of two context paragraphs, for example about two roommates, Jane and 
Mary, and then verified the truth of a target sentence, for example “It is Jane who wants 
to get a television.” The target sentence was preceded by either (a) a false presupposition 
context which described Jane wanting to buy a radio or (b) a false assertion context 
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which described Mary wanting to buy a television. Following the false presupposition 
context, the presupposition of the target sentence was inconsistent because Jane wanted a 
radio not a television. Following the false assertion context, the assertion of the target 
sentence was inconsistent because it was not Jane, but rather Mary who wanted the 
television. Subjects were slower to verify the falsity of inconsistent presuppositions than 
of inconsistent assertions. If presuppositions are processed first, as the Given-New 
hypothesis proposes, subjects should have been faster to identify false presuppositions 
than false assertions. Here, however, the results were similar to those of Hornby (1974), 
with subjects showing more difficulty (i.e., slower verification times) processing false 
presuppositions than false assertions, providing converging support for the New-Given 
hypothesis. 
The timing of presuppositional processing is an important component of the 
hypotheses under investigation in the present experiments. Because the sentences 
presented by MacDonald & Just (1989) were without context, the negation should trigger 
a search for a relevant presupposition against which the negation can be comprehended 
(Levine & Hagaman, 2008; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Urbach & Kutas, 2010). 
According to the New-Given strategy (cf. Hornby, 1974; Langford & Holmes, 1979), 
prior to the completion of this presuppositional search, the reader will have finished 
processing the assertion. This should lead to the negated concept being suppressed. 
Measuring the activation of the negated concept at this point in time should produce the 
pattern of results found by MacDonald and Just. However, the presuppositional search 
should then draw attention back to the negated concept, activating the negated concept 
such that it is no longer suppressed. It is therefore possible that the contradictory results 
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of previous studies may be due to differences in the times at which the activation of the 
negated concepts was being measured.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 used similar materials to those used in MacDonald and Just's (1989) 
experiments, but also systematically varied the delay between the target noun and the 
probe recognition task. Subjects read single sentences that contained unlicensed negation 
of Noun 1 (12a) or Noun 2 (12b), or no negation (12c). Following each sentence, subjects  
(12a) Every Friday Tina prepared not a lecture but only an activity … 
 (12b) Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture but not an activity ... 
 (12c) Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture and an activity ... 
 (13) Did Tina prepare a lecture?  
completed a probe recognition task in which they verified whether or not a given word 
was presented in the sentence. The probe words were either Noun 1 or Noun 2, and were 
presented 0 ms, 500 ms, or 1000 ms after the end of the sentence, the latter being 
manipulated between subjects. Additionally, subjects verified a comprehension statement 
(like 13 above) to ensure they were fully reading and understanding the statements.  
It was hypothesized that if presupposition processing is completed within 1000 
ms1
                                                          
1 1000 ms was arbitrarily chosen as a delay that was long enough after MacDonald & 
Just’s (1989) probe task that it should provide enough time for the additional 
presupposition processing to at least begin. 
 
 and if this processing reverses the suppression that occurs during assertion 
processing, subjects should produce slower recognition times for negated concepts only 
when the probe recognition task occurs before the completion of presuppositional 
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processing, creating a negation by delay interaction. On this basis, it is expected that in 
the 0 ms delay condition, subjects will respond slower to probe words when they were 
negated in the statement than when they were non-negated, replicating the findings of 
MacDonald and Just (1989). The same should be true of the 500 ms delay condition when 
presuppositional processing is still incomplete. However, in the 1000 ms condition, if 
presuppositional processing has run to completion, negated entities should have sufficient 
time to become reactivated, making them equally if not more active than the non-negated 
entities.  
Method 
Subjects. One-hundred and sixty-eight students enrolled in a general psychology 
course at the University of Arkansas participated in the experiment to partially fulfill a 
research requirement. All subjects were native-English speakers. A subject's data were 
excluded from analysis if (a) the subject's response accuracy to the probe words or 
comprehension statements was less than 70% or (b) if the subject's mean reading time 
was substantially (i.e., ±3 SDs) faster or slower than the overall mean reading time. These 
criteria resulted in the exclusion of 17 subjects, leaving data from 151 subjects to be 
included in the analyses.  
Materials and Design. There were 42 experimental sentences which appeared in 
one of three conditions (see Table 1). Each sentence presented a character by name 
followed by a past-tense action verb and a compound direct object with two nouns that 
were selected to be of similar length but not close semantic associates. Negation was 
manipulated such that it occurred for the first direct object (Noun 1 Negated), the second 
direct object (Noun 2 Negated), or neither direct object (No Negation). In addition, there 
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were 58 filler sentences. About half of these filler sentences had syntactic structures 
similar to the three experimental conditions, while the rest contained either two negated 
direct objects, a single negated direct object, or a single non-negated direct object to help 
mask the manipulation. In addition, each sentence had a corresponding comprehension 
statement (e.g., Tina prepared a lecture), half of which required “yes” responses and half 
of which required “no” responses. 
 Each subject saw each experimental sentence in one condition and all filler 
sentences. Twelve lists of experimental sentences were created with the following 
constraints: One-third of the experimental sentences in a list were of each condition 
(Noun 1 Negated, Noun 2 Negated, and No Negation). Half of the nouns probed in each 
condition were Noun 1, half were Noun 2. Across lists, each sentence appeared in each 
condition one-third of the time, half the time with Noun 1 being probed, half the time 
with Noun 2 being probed. The experimental trials never contained a false probe, 
requiring the majority of the filler trials to contain false probes so that each recognition 
answer occurred equally often. When the filler trials contained "yes" probes, they were 
always nouns other than the direct object(s). Finally, a second set of experimental 
materials were created that reversed the order of the nouns, such that Noun 1 was placed 
in the Noun 2 position and Noun 2 was placed in the Noun 1 position. These 
counterbalancing procedures were used within each of the three substantive between-
subjects conditions: the 0 ms delay, the 500 ms delay, and the 1000 ms delay. Thus, each 
subject was presented with 100 total trials, with half of the probes and comprehension 
statements requiring “yes” responses and the other half requiring “no” responses.  
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Procedure. The experiment began with three practice blocks. In the first practice 
block, subjects familiarized themselves with the response keys by pressing the left arrow 
key on the keyboard (which was labeled “Y”) when the screen read “Yes” and the right 
arrow key on the keyboard (which was labeled “N”) when the screen read “No.” They 
completed ten of these yes-no trials and received feedback about the correctness of their 
responses. In the second practice block, subjects practiced the probe-recognition task. 
Each trial began with the words “Press the spacebar when ready” presented in the center 
of the computer screen in all capital letters. When subjects pressed the spacebar, a 
sentence was presented in the center of the computer screen. Subjects pressed the 
spacebar to indicate when they had finished reading, which cleared the screen. After a set 
delay (either 0 ms, 500 ms, or 1000 ms, depending on the condition the subject had been 
assigned to), a single word appeared in the center of the screen in all capital letters. 
Subjects indicated with the yes and no keys whether or not the presented word occurred 
in the sentence. Again, subjects received feedback about the correctness of their 
responses. In the third practice block, subjects practiced responding to the comprehension 
statements. Again, sentences were presented in the center of the screen. When subjects 
finished reading the sentence they pressed the spacebar which removed the sentence from 
the screen and replaced it with a comprehension statement. Subjects then indicated with 
the yes or no keys whether or not the comprehension statement was true. Feedback about 
the correctness of their responses were again provided.  
Subjects then began the experimental session. Each trial consisted of a sentence, a 
probe word, and a comprehension statement. At the beginning of each trial, subjects were 
given the instruction “PRESS THE SPACEBAR WHEN READY.” When they pressed 
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the spacebar, the full experimental or filler sentence appeared centered on the screen and 
remained until the subject pressed the spacebar a second time to indicate they had 
finished reading. Following experimental sentences, subjects were presented with a probe 
word that was either Noun 1 or Noun 2. Following filler sentences, the probe word was a 
word from the sentence other than Noun 1 or Noun 2 or a false probe. The probes were 
presented either 0 ms, 500 ms, or 1000ms (manipulated between subjects) after the 
subject pressed the spacebar, and subjects indicated with a yes or no response whether the 
probe word had occurred in the sentence by pressing the arrow keys labeled “Y” or “N.” 
Reaction times for these responses were recorded. After the subjects respond to the probe 
word, a comprehension statement appeared on the screen and subjects indicated with a 
yes or no response whether or not the statement was true, again by pressing arrow keys 
labeled “Y” or “N.” Feedback was no longer provided.  
The experimental session consisted of 100 trials (42 experimental and 58 fillers) 
in four blocks of 25 trials each. The order of the blocks, as well as the the order of the 
trials within each block, were randomized with the restriction that the first statement of 
each block was always a filler statement to allow time for the subjects to fully return their 
attention to the task after the mandatory 10 s breaks between blocks. Subjects were 
instructed to read the statements as they normally would for comprehension and to 
respond to the probe words as quickly and accurately as possible. They were free to take 
breaks between trials. The experiment lasted 30 to 45 minutes. 
Results 
Analysis. Because subjects and items are both random-effects variables, data 
were analyzed twice, once with subjects treated as a random-effects variable (averaging 
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over items), for which F1 and t1 are reported, and once with items treated as a random-
effects variable (averaging over subjects), for which F2 and t2 are reported. Data analysis 
was limited to probe responses that were (a) correct, (b) between 400 ms and 3000 ms, 
and (c) less than 3 SDs away from each subject’s mean response time. All tests were 
evaluated with an alpha level of .05. 
All condition means appear in Table 2. A 3 (Delay) × 3 (Sentence) × 2 (Noun) 
mixed-factor ANOVA, with the first factor being between-subjects and the second and 
third factors being repeated measures, revealed a significant main effect of delay, F1(2, 
148) = 5.17, p = .007,  = .07, F2(2, 166) = 71.56, p < .001,  = .46. A main effect 
contrast for this factor showed that response times were significantly faster in the 500 ms 
delay condition than the combined 0 and 1000 ms delay conditions, t1(148) = 3.19, p = 
.002, d = 0.55, t2(83) = 11.58, p < .001, d = 1.372
The only significant two-way interaction was between sentence type and noun 
(see Figure 1), with probe recognition times to the two concepts differing when one was 
negated (Noun 1 Negated and Noun 2 Negated) but not when both concepts were present 
(No Negation), F1(2, 296) = 12.60, p < .001, 
. Main effects were non-significant for 
sentence, F1(2, 296) = 1.68, p = .20, F2(2, 166) = 1.23, p = .30, and noun, F1(1, 148) = 
0.19, p = .66, F2(1, 83) = 0.24, p = .63. 
 = .08, F2(2, 332) = 10.59, p < .001,  = 
.11. In the two negation conditions, probe recognition times were slower when the 
concept was negated than when it was non-negated for both Noun 1 (Mnegated = 899, Mnon-
negated = 856), t1(150) = 3.33, p = .001, d = 0.27, t2(83) = 3.17, p = .002, d = 0.35, and 
                                                          
2 Effect sizes can be very different between the subject and item analyses because 
missing data affects the two analyses differently.  
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Noun 2 (Mnegated = 897, Mnon-negated = 869), t1(150) = 2.101, p = .04, d = 0.17, t2(83) = 
2.040, p = .04, d = 0.22. 
This result was qualified by a significant three-way interaction (see Table 2) 
between sentence type, noun, and delay, F1(4, 296) = 3.92, p = .004,  = .05, F2(4, 332) 
= 3.73, p = .005,  = .04. To further explore this interaction, paired-samples t-tests were 
conducted to compare the recognition times for Noun 1 probes in the Noun 1 Negated 
condition to the No Negation condition, separately for each delay. The same comparisons 
were made between Noun 2 in the Noun 2 Negated condition and the No Negation 
condition.  
In the 0 ms delay condition (see Figure 2), probe recognition times were 
significantly longer when Noun 1 was negated than when it was non-negated, t1(49) = 
3.69, p = .001, d = 0.52, t2(83) = 3.06, p = .003, d = 0.33. This difference was significant 
for Noun 2 in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 2.15, p = .04, d = 0.30, and nearly significant 
in the item analysis, t2(83) = 1.67, p = .098, d = 0.18. In the 500 ms delay condition (see 
Figure 3), Noun 1 probe recognition times were nearly significantly slower for negated 
concepts than for non-negated concepts in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 1.92, p = .06, d = 
0.27, and significantly slower in the item analysis, t2(83) = 2.20, p = .03, d = 0.24.This 
difference, however, was non-significant for Noun 2 in both analyses, t1(49) = 1.15, p = 
.25, t2 (83) = 1.38, p = .17. In the 1000 ms delay condition (see Figure 4), there were no 
differences in probe recognition times for Noun 1, t1(50) = 0.72, p = .47, t2(83) = 0.47, p 
= .64, or Noun 2, t1(50) = 0.62, p = .54, t2 (83) = 0.65, p = .52. 
To get a clearer picture of how this effect changed over time, a negation effect 
was computed for each noun at each delay condition (see Figure 5). The Noun 1 negation 
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effect was computed by taking the difference between Noun 1 in the Noun 1 Negated 
condition and Noun 1 in the No Negation condition, while the Noun 2 negation effect 
was computed by taking the difference between Noun 2 in the Noun 2 Negated condition 
and Noun 2 in the No Negation condition; that is, reaction times for a concept were 
computed when the concept was negated and compared to when it was not negated. 
Single-sample t-tests revealed a significant negation effect in the 0 ms delay condition for 
Noun 1, t1(49) = 3.69, p = .001, d = 0.52, t2 (83) = 3.06 , p = .003, d = 0.33 , and for Noun 
2 in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 2.15, p = .04, d = 0.30, but not the item analysis, t2(83) 
=1.67 , p = .10, d = 0.18. In the 500 ms delay condition, there was a nearly significant 
negation effect for Noun 1 in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 1.92, p = .06, d = 0.27, which 
was significant in the item analysis, t2(83) = 2.20, p = .03, d = 0.24, but the negation 
effect was non-significant for Noun 2 in both analyses, t1(49) = 1.15, p = .25, t2(83) = 
1.38, p = .17. And in the 1000 ms delay condition, the negation effect was non-significant 
for Noun 1, t (50) = 0.72, p = .47, t2(83) = 0.47, p = .64, and Noun 2, t1(50) = 0.62, p = 
.54, t2 (83) = 0.65, p = .52. 
Discussion 
The results supported the hypothesis that the effect of negation changes over time. 
When there was no delay (0 ms) between sentence and probe recognition task, concepts 
were responded to slower when they had been negated than when they had been non-
negated, replicating the findings of MacDonald and Just (1989). However, with a 500 ms 
delay the results were mixed, with a significant difference found for Noun 1, but not for 
Noun 2. With a 1000 ms delay, there were no significant differences between negated and 
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non-negated concepts for either Noun 1 or Noun 2. Thus, it appears that the negation 
effect diminishes over time.  
 An explanation for this effect is that the initial assertional processing of the 
negated concepts leads to suppression by the end of the sentence, as seen in the shortest 
(0 ms) delay condition. But the additional time in the 500 and 100 ms delay conditions 
gives subjects a chance to begin processing or possibly completely process the 
presupposition that makes the unlicensed negation relevant. This processing involving the 
negated noun causes it to be re-activated such that it counteracts the initial suppression 
and the negation effect is no longer present. For example, consider the sentence “Tina 
prepared not a lecture but only an activity for her students.” The assertion of this sentence 
is that Tina prepared an activity and not a lecture. Thus, when the reader processes this 
assertion, the concept of activity increases in activation and, conversely, the concept of 
lecture is suppressed. But when the reader then processes the missing presupposition to 
make sense of the unlicensed negation, the concept of lecture is re-activated such that it is 
no less active than when lecture is non-negated.   
If it is true that the resurgence of activation when negation is unlicensed is the 
result of presuppositional processing, these findings also provide a rudimentary timeline 
for the process. Because the negation effect is present with a 0 ms delay, but reduced and 
non-significant with a 500 ms delay, it appears that presuppositional processing has 
begun somewhere within this timeframe. And because the magnitude of the difference 
between negated and non-negated concepts continued to decrease from the 500 ms delay 
to the 1000 ms delay, it seems that some amount of processing continues beyond 500 ms. 
However, it is unclear whether presuppositional processing is complete within 1000 ms 
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or if it is still ongoing. If it is ongoing, it is possible that the continued processing would 
further activate the negated concept, possibly leading to a level of activation significantly 
higher than the non-negated concept, as predicted by the pragmatic-inference hypothesis 
(Levine & Hagaman, 2008).  
The probe recognition task may not be suitable for measuring this effect at longer 
delays because the screen remains blank during the delay. In fact, the analysis of probe 
recognition times for each delay suggests there may be some concerns even with a delay 
of 1000 ms. Subjects responded significantly faster in the 500 ms delay than in the 0 ms 
delay, as would be expected since the noun is increasing in activation. Therefore, it 
would be expected that responses would be equally fast if not faster in the 1000 ms delay 
since the ongoing processing should push activation even higher. But responses in the 
1000 ms delay were actually roughly equivalent in speed to those at the 0 ms delay, 
significantly slower than the 500 ms delay, not faster. Since the negation effect continued 
to diminish in the 1000 ms delay, the slower responses may be taken as evidence that 
subjects’ attention may have drifted from the task. Another task, then, is necessary to 
evaluate this re-activation on a longer time scale.  
A final point of discussion is the use of the No Negation condition as a baseline. 
To assess the impact of negation, response times for the negated concepts in the Noun 1 
Negated and Noun 2 Negated conditions were compared to the concept in the same 
position in the No Negation condition. This baseline was chosen because it was used by 
MacDonald and Just (1989). But instead of comparing Noun 1 in the Noun 1 Negated 
condition to Noun 1 in the No Negation condition, it could also be compared to Noun 1 in 
the Noun 2 Negated condition. This would provide a less-confounded comparison 
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because the concepts would both be in sentences containing negation, while still 
occurring in the same position in the sentence. This alternative baseline was tested, but 
the results were not substantially different than the original baseline, and therefore are not 
reported.  
Experiment 2 
Despite their heavy usage in the psycholinguistics literature, probe-word tasks 
may not be the best method of measuring activation. Gordon, Hendrick, and Foster 
(2000) found evidence that when subjects expect to engage in a probe-word task, they 
create a “probe-list memory” such that they treat the text like an unrelated list of words to 
be remembered rather than a cohesive whole. With this probe-list memory in place, 
subjects then simply check probe words against this probe-list representation to respond 
to probe words. To the extent that this occurs in probe-word tasks, the results may not 
reflect comprehension processes, but instead may reflect memory strategies that are 
unrelated to comprehension.  
Thus, to find converging evidence for the results of Experiment 1 using a task that 
would not induce a special strategy, Experiment 2 assessed the activation levels of 
negated and non-negated concepts using an eye-tracker to record eye-movements as 
subjects read sentences containing anaphors, which are expressions, like pronouns, that 
refer to previously-mentioned concepts. Subjects read sentence pairs that included both a 
singular and a plural direct object. The negation sentence manipulated the position of the 
singular object and whether or not it was negated (14a-d) and was always followed by the 
same reference sentence which contained an anaphor referring to the singular noun (15).  
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(14a) Penny did bake a cake but did not bake brownies for dessert.  
 (14b) Penny did not bake a cake but did bake brownies for dessert. 
 (14c) Penny did not bake brownies but did bake a cake for dessert. 
 (14d) Penny did bake brownies but did not bake a cake for dessert. 
 (15) She had a mix for one in her pantry ... 
These manipulations created four conditions such that differences between negated and 
non-negated concepts could be compared both when they are relatively far away from 
(Position 1) and relatively close to (Position 2) the anaphor in the reference sentence. 
Several eye-tracking measures were analyzed for the critical regions around the anaphor 
in the reference sentence to assess the activation level of the concept to which the 
anaphor was referring. Presumably, the less active the concept of the antecedent is, the 
more difficulty a subject will have processing the anaphor, as reflected in various 
measures indicting reading difficulty. This method is more naturalistic than using a probe 
word task since it more closely mirrors normal reading by having the subjects continue 
reading instead of switching attention to the probe task.  
It was hypothesized that subjects would show signs of processing difficulty on the 
anaphor (i.e., longer reading times, more regressive eye-movements) when the negated 
concept to which it refers was in Position 2 compared to when it was in Position 1. The 
additional time that passes between the negated noun and the anaphor when the noun is in 
Position 1 compared to when it is in Position 2 should give subjects the opportunity to 
complete the presuppositional processing necessary to make sense of the unlicensed 
negation. As in Experiment 1, the presuppositional processing should increase activation 
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of the negated concept, which should in turn make it easier for subjects to process the 
anaphor.  
Method 
Subjects. Sixty students from the same population as those who participated in 
Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2. All subjects were native-English speakers 
with normal or to corrected-to-normal vision. Data from nine subjects were excluded 
from the analysis because the subjects correctly responded to less than 60% of the 
comprehension statements, and an additional two subjects' data were removed for having 
unusable eye-tracking data3
Materials. Subjects read 32 experimental sentence-pairs (see Table 3). The first 
sentence, referred to as the negation sentence, contained two verb phrases, one with a 
singular direct object and the other with a plural direct object. The noun of interest was 
the singular direct object. Four versions of the first sentence were created by 
manipulating the position of the singular direct object (Position 1 or Position 2) and 
whether it was non-negated or negated (Present or Negated). The negation sentence was 
followed by a reference sentence that contained a singular pronoun (e.g.. it or one) that 
unambiguously referred to the singular direct object. The distance between the antecedent 
and anaphor when the antecedent was in Position 1 ranged from 8 to 14 words (M = 
10.59, SD = 1.34). When the antecedent was in Position 2, the distance ranged from 4 to 
7 words (M = 5.31, SD = 0.92). The reference sentence appeared in one of two versions, 
depending on whether the singular direct object was non-negated (affirmative reference) 
.  
                                                          
3 Several factors make subjects’ eyes more difficult to track, such as thick glasses frames, 
excessive eye makeup, dark eyelashes, lazy eyes, etc.  
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or negated (negative reference). These two conditions were identical through the first 
clause, where the anaphor reading times were measured. They differed only in the second 
clause, which made the statement fit the given scenario, but this occurred after the 
regions on which analyses were performed; thus, this difference should not affect 
subjects’ processing within the critical regions. The sentence-pairs appeared together on 
one or two lines, depending on their length, but both the antecedent and the anaphor 
critical region always occurred on the first line. Each sentence-pair was followed by a 
comprehension statement which subjects verified as true or false using predefined keys 
on a game controller to ensure subjects were reading for comprehension. In addition to 
the experimental sentence-pairs, subjects read 58 filler statement pairs which were 
syntactically similar to the experimental materials but designed to obscure the 
experimental manipulation; the fillers were also followed by true-false comprehension 
statements.  
Because the materials were relatively complex and potentially difficult to 
comprehend, a pilot study was conducted to ensure that subjects were able to correctly 
identify the antecedent of the anaphor. Ten graduate students from the University of 
Arkansas were presented the experimental sentence-pairs on a computer screen. Subjects 
read each sentence-pair and pressed the spacebar to indicate they had finished reading it. 
The sentence was then removed from the screen and subjects indicated to which of the 
two direct objects the anaphor was referring. Subjects accurately identified the antecedent 
at least 70% of the time for all materials.  
Apparatus. Eye-movements were was recorded using an EyeLink 1000 desktop-
mounted eye tracker manufactured by SR Research (Mississauga, Ontario, Canada). 
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Sampling frequency was 1000 Hz; only the right eye was tracked. The stimuli were 
presented on a 20" CRT monitor with a screen resolution of 1024 x 768 and a refresh rate 
of 85 Hz.  
Procedure. Prior to the start of the experiment, subjects were calibrated on the 
EyeLink 1000 using a 9-point display. Calibration was repeated until tracking error was 
less than 0.5° of visual arc on average and the maximum error was less than 1°. Subjects 
were then given instructions about how to interact with the computer using a game 
controller with different buttons assigned for each response.  
Each trial consisted of a sentence-pair to read and a comprehension statement. At 
the beginning of each trial, a fixation point appeared on the left side of the screen to 
indicate the location of the first word of the sentence-pair. While fixating on this point, 
subjects pressed an assigned button to begin the trial and the negation and reference 
sentence or filler sentence-pair appeared left-justified at that point of the screen. When 
finished reading the sentence-pair, subjects pressed an assigned button and the sentences 
were replaced by a comprehension statement. Subjects indicated whether the 
comprehension statement was true or false by pressing assigned buttons. The fixation 
point then reappeared and subjects were free to begin the next trial when ready. Trials 
were divided into four blocks of 20 trials each, with short breaks in between. Subjects 
were recalibrated following breaks if necessary, and at any point during the experiment 
when the subject removed his or her head from the eye-tracker's chin rest, or if the 
experimenter noticed a calibration problem. An experimenter was present in the room 
throughout the experimental session. 
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Results 
Analysis. Two regions of the second sentence of each sentence pair were 
analyzed. The critical region was defined as the word before the anaphor plus the anaphor 
itself. Because the anaphors were only two or three letters long (i.e., it, one), it is possible 
that it was being read while the subjects were fixating on the previous word (Underwood 
& McConkie, 1985). The postcritical region was defined as the two words following the 
anaphor. This region was analyzed to examine any continuing processing of the anaphor, 
because the processing of a region continues even after the eyes have moved on in the 
text (Rayner, 1998). 
For each item, the regions of analysis were identical across conditions. Fixations 
less than 80 ms and within 1° of visual angle from the previous fixation were merged 
with the previous fixation. All other fixations less than 80 ms or greater than 1000 ms 
(1500 ms for the regression-path duration analysis) were removed. Additionally, the 
analyses only included trials in which subjects fixated in the region under analysis. All 
tests were evaluated with an alpha level of .05. 
Eye movement measures. Four eye movement measures were assessed for each 
region of interest: (1) total reading time is the sum of all fixations within a region, which 
is a measure of overall comprehension difficulty for the region; (2) gaze duration is the 
sum of all fixations in a region until the point of fixation moves out of the region either to 
the left or right, which is a measure of the initial processing of the region; (3) regression-
path duration is the sum of all fixations from the time that the region is first entered from 
the left until it is first exited to the right, which is a measure of early processing 
difficulty; and (4) first-pass regression ratio is the proportion of trials in which a 
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regressive eye movement is made out of the region, which is another measure of early 
processing difficulty. Table 4 displays means and standard deviations for all measures as 
a function of condition and region of interest. 
Critical Region. Analysis of the critical region provided weak evidence that 
subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the antecedent was in Position 2, 
and stronger evidence that subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the 
antecedent was negated than when it was non-negated. A 2 (Negation) × 2 (Position) 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for each eye movement measure.  
 Analysis of total durations revealed a nearly significant main effect of position in 
the subject analysis, with reading times on the critical region being shorter when the 
antecedent of the anaphor was in Position 2 than when it was in Position 1, F1(1, 47) = 
3.02, p = .09,     = .06 (see Figure 6), but this effect was non-significant in the item 
analysis, F2(1, 27) = 1.19, p = .29. Analysis of regression path duration also revealed a 
marginally significant main effect of position in the same direction in the subject 
analysis, F1(1, 47) = 2.88, p = .096,  = .06 (see Figure 7), but this effect was non-
significant in the item analysis, F2(1, 27) = .046,   p = .83. Analysis of first pass 
regression ratios revealed a significant main effect of negation in the item analysis, with 
subjects regressing out of the critical region more often when the antecedent of the 
anaphor was non-negated than when it was negated, F2(1, 27) = 5.32, p = .03,  = .17 
(see Figure 8), but this effect was non-significant in the subject analysis, F1(1, 47) = .20, 
p = .66. Analysis of gaze durations revealed no significant effects (Fs < 1). There were no 
significant interactions for any of the eye movement measures.  
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Postcritical Region. Analysis of the postcritical region again provided evidence 
that subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the antecedent was negated 
than when it was non-negated. A 2 (Negation) × 2 (Position) repeated-measures ANOVA 
was conducted for each eye movement measure. Condition-by-region means for each 
measure are reported in Table 4.  
Analysis of first pass regression ratios revealed a significant main effect of 
negation in the subject analysis, with subjects regressing out of the postcritical region 
more often when the antecedent of the anaphor was non-negated than when it was 
negated F1(1, 47) = 4.62, p = .037,  = .09 (see Figure 9), but this effect was non-
significant in the item analysis, F2(1, 27) = 0.23, p = .64. Analysis of gaze durations, total 
durations, and regression path durations revealed no significant effects (Fs < 1). There 
were no significant interactions for any of the eye movement measures in the post critical 
region. 
Discussion 
The hypothesis that processing negated nouns would be more difficult when the 
they were in Position 2 than when they were in Position 1 was not supported. Although 
the predicted interaction between negation and position did not occur, several main 
effects emerged.  
The nearly significant main effect of position for both total duration and 
regression path duration measures in the subject analysis of the critical region revealed 
that subjects read the critical region faster and referred back to the previous text less often 
when the antecedent was in Position 2 than when it was in Position 1. This effect is likely 
the result of the recency effect (O’Brien, Plewes, & Albrecht, 1990), given that the nouns 
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in Position 2 were more recently mentioned than nouns in Position 1 and the effect was 
relatively weak.  
Of more theoretical importance, the main effect of negation for first pass 
regression ratios in the item analysis of the critical region and the subject analysis of the 
postcritical region revealed that subjects regressed out of the region of analysis less often 
when the antecedent was negated than when it was non-negated. This indicates that the 
subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the antecedent had been negated, 
which suggests that the negated concepts had a higher level of activation than non-
negated concepts. It is generally accepted that negated concepts are less active than non-
negated concepts, so this result is relatively unsupported by the literature, but fits well 
with the results of Experiment 1, with negated concepts in unlicensed contexts being no 
less active than non-negated concepts after a short amount of time has passed. However, 
these results should be interpreted with some reservation, since none of the effects were 
present in both the subject and item analyses. This limits the interpretation of the results 
to the specific subjects in the subject analyses or to the specific materials in the item 
analyses. 
General Discussion 
Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that negated concepts are less active than 
non-negated concepts immediately after a sentence, but that this difference is no longer 
present when subjects are given additional processing time. The favored explanation is 
that the negated concepts are suppressed by assertion processing and then re-activated by 
presupposition processing. However, it is also possible that the suppression fades over 
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time regardless of presupposition processing, an explanation that is impossible to rule out 
with the current data.  
Experiment 2 did not find support for the predicted interaction between negation 
and position. It was hypothesized that subjects would have more difficulty reading the 
regions of interest when the negated antecedent was in Position 2 than when it was in 
Position 1 because there would have been less time for the presupposition processing to 
occur. However, the results suggest just the opposite, that subjects actually had somewhat 
less difficulty when the negated antecedents were in Position 2 compared to Position 1.  
There are several possible reasons why the hypothesized interaction between 
negation and position did not occur in Experiment 2. First, the materials may not have 
created the desired effect of allowing enough time for presuppositional processing to be 
completed for the nouns in Position 1 but not for nouns in Position 2. The two 
alternatives are that (1) presuppositional processing was completed for both nouns or (2) 
that presuppositional processing was not completed for either noun. The first alternative 
seems more likely, since the negated concepts appeared to be more active than non-
negated concepts, suggesting that the presuppositional processing had already occurred.  
It may also be that presuppositional processing only needs to begin in order for 
the negated concepts to increase in activation, rather than being fully completed. In this 
case, both positions would allow sufficient time for presupposition processing to begin 
and thus increase the activation of the negated concept. However, the results of 
Experiment 1 suggest that negated concepts continue to increase in activation over time, 
at least up to a full second. Taken together, the results from both experiments suggests 
that activation may initially increase when presuppositional processing begins and then 
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continue to increase as the processing continues. It is unclear from either experiment 
whether presuppositional processing is complete at the time when activation is measured 
via a probe word or anaphor reading time.  
A third possible explanation is that the difference in distance between the noun 
and the anaphor for Position 1 and Position 2 was not distinct enough. The distance 
varied across the materials, with as few as eight words between the Position 1 noun and 
the anaphor and as many as seven words between the Position 2 noun and the anaphor. 
Further differentiating the distance between conditions could have led to a greater 
difference between the conditions.  
  A fourth possibility is that processing of the presupposition is delayed until the 
end of the sentence. This would explain why significant results were found in Experiment 
1 where the distance manipulation started after the sentence ended, but not in Experiment 
2 where the distance manipulation started before the end of the sentence. This 
explanation fits well with a “wait and see” theory of language processing (Bouma & 
deVoogd, 1974), which argues that processing is delayed until a sufficient amount of 
information is acquired to fully comprehend it. However, theories of incremental 
processing, which argue that words are processed immediately upon encountering them, 
have much more empirical support (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1980). Therefore, this is an 
unlikely explanation for the lack of results.  
 The final potential explanation to be discussed here is that presuppositional 
processing may not have any effect on the activation level of either negated or non-
negated concepts. However, there does appear to be something occurring when subjects 
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are given additional processing time, but whether or not this effect is caused by 
presupposition processing cannot be determined by the present experiments.  
Although the hypothesized interaction did not occur in Experiment 2, the main 
effect of negation is an important result. Unlike Experiment 1, in which negated and non-
negated concepts were found to be at roughly equal activation levels, Experiment 2's 
results provided evidence for a higher level of activation for negated concepts than for 
non-negated concepts as predicted by the pragmatic-inference hypothesis (Levine & 
Hagaman, 2008). Therefore, both experiments suggest that the activation level of negated 
concepts increases to a level equal to or possibly greater than non-negated concepts  if 
subjects are given sufficient time between the presentation of the concept and a 
subsequent probe task or anaphor.  
The effect of presupposition processing on the activation level of negated 
concepts in unlicensed contexts may help explain the discrepancies within the literature. 
This presupposition processing model proposes that two factors, time and whether the 
negation was licensed or unlicensed, should interact such that additional processing time 
will increase the activation of negated concepts only when the negation is unlicensed. 
The existing literature fits well within this framework.  
Several previous studies that have found negated concepts to be less active than 
non-negated concepts presented subjects sentences with licensed negation. The target 
sentences in Kaup (2001) were preceded by context passages several lines long which 
provided details that licensed the negation. These contexts set up the idea that the 
passage’s protagonist was choosing between alternatives, as in (16), which licenses the 
negation that occurs in (17).  
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(16) John is reading the [Lego] booklet and is wondering what he could build 
next.  
(17) After a while, he decides to build the castle but not the church.  
By introducing a decision between multiple alternatives, the addition of “but not the 
church” becomes relevant. Thus, it should be expected that negated concepts would be 
less active than non-negated concepts. This is indeed what was found, even with the 
probes being presented 2500 ms after the target sentence.  
Kaup and Zwaan (2003) also preceded their target sentences with context 
passages, and again the negation was licensed. However, the negation was not licensed 
because of the context, but rather because the negation was about the assertion of the 
sentences. Take, for example, the target sentence “Susan thought that they would buy the 
bike, and she only wished the bike didn’t have a blue frame.” This sentence asserts that 
the bike is blue. The negation is involved in this assertion, rather than a presupposition. It 
is not necessary for the subjects to already have a representation of the bike being a color 
other than blue for the sentence to be comprehended, therefore no presupposition search 
is required to comprehend the negation. It should again be expected that negated concepts 
would show less activation than non-negated concepts, since no presupposition search 
will occur to reactivate the negated concept. With probes presented 500 ms after the 
target sentence, this is precisely what was found.  
 The negation in the sentences presented by Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) was 
also licensed because it was related to the sentence’s assertion. For example, consider the 
sentence “The kindergarten is not a zoo.” This sentence asserts that the kindergarten was 
a calm place. Again, it is not necessary for the subjects to already have a representation of 
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the kindergarten being a noisy place. As expected following licensed negation, negated 
concepts were found to be less active than non-negated concepts at 1000 ms after the 
target sentence.  
 Thus, it appears that when negation is licensed, either by preceding context or by 
virtue of being part of the sentence’s assertion, negated concepts are less active than non-
negated concepts. This finding is consistent across time, having been found at 500, 1000, 
and 2500 ms, suggesting that additional processing time does not have an effect on 
licensed negation.  
 Conversely, when negation is unlicensed, the relative levels of activation between 
negated and non-negated concepts varies as a function of time. MacDonald and Just 
(1989) presented subjects with single sentences like “Elizabeth baked some bread but no 
cookies.” Unlike the previous cases where the negation was part of the sentence’s 
assertion, in this case it seems to be part of a missing presupposition. The assertion here 
is that Elizabeth baked bread. The function of “but no cookies” is not to add new 
information, but rather to disconfirm a prior expectation. Unless there was reason to 
expect that Elizabeth would bake cookies, there is an infinite number of other items that 
could have been included, since Elizabeth also did not bake a cake, a pie, a telephone, 
etc. Because the mention of cookies seems irrelevant to the reader, the negation is 
unlicensed, and they must create the missing presupposition themselves.  
Presenting the probe task at 0 ms, MacDonald and Just (1989) found evidence of 
negated concepts being less active than non-negated concepts. Experiment 1 of the 
present paper, which used materials modeled after MacDonald and Just, replicated this 
35 
 
result at 0 ms, but found no such difference when the probe task was presented at 500 ms 
or 1000 ms.  
 Levine and Hagaman (2008) and Experiment 2 of the present paper both 
measured reading times on anaphors following sentences with unlicensed negation 
similar to the previous example. Based on the number of words between the end of the 
target sentence and the anaphor, subjects first read the anaphor about 1500-2000 ms after 
the target sentence in both experiments. Levine and Hagaman found no difference in the 
activation levels of negated and non-negated concepts and Experiment 2 found some 
evidence that negated concepts might actually become more highly activated than non-
negated concepts. Thus, it appears that after reading unlicensed negation, the activation 
level of negated concepts is initially lower than non-negated concepts and gradually 
increases over time, possibly even to a higher level than non-negated concepts.  
Although a comparison of licensed and unlicensed negation in the existing 
literature supports the presupposition processing model, future research examining the 
reduction of the negation effect over time in both licensed and unlicensed contexts will be 
necessary to determine if the increase in activation is indeed the result of presuppositional 
processing or if, instead, it is a gradual decrease in suppression of the negated concept 
over time. Future research should also utilize methodologies other than probe tasks, such 
as anaphor reading times, to allow the investigation of the level of activation of negated 
concepts at longer delays than 1000 ms, to find the point at which additional processing 
time no longer leads to increases in activation, which would be indicative of the 
completion of presuppositional processing.  
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Table 1 
PROBES: lecture, activity 
Noun1 Negated: Every Friday Tina prepared not a lecture but 
only an activity for her students. 
Noun2 Negated: Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture but not 
an activity for her students 
No Negation: Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture and an 
activity for her students.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 1 
 0ms 500 ms 1000 ms 
M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Noun 1 
Present 891 (21.6) 786 (19.0) 891 (30.3) 
Negated 964 (24.4) 822 (21.4) 911 (31.7) 
Noun 2 
Present 904 (24.4) 806 (19.7) 898 (30.1) 
Negated 944 (20.4) 833 (25.1) 913 (30.3) 
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Table 3 
Position 1 Present (Affirmative Reference) 
Penny did bake a cake but did not bake brownies for dessert. She had a mix for one in 
her pantry, and had been planning to make it all week. 
Position 1 Negated (Negative Reference) 
Penny did not bake a cake but did bake brownies for desert. She had a mix for one in her 
pantry, but was not in the mood for one. 
Position 2 Present (Affirmative Reference) 
Penny did not bake brownies but did bake a cake for dessert. She had a mix for one in 
her pantry, and had been planning to make it all week. 
Position 2 Negated (Negative Reference) 
Penny did bake brownies but did not bake a cake for dessert. She had a mix for one in 
her pantry, but was not in the mood for one. 
Comprehension Statement: 
Penny had a cake mix.  YES 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 2 
  Negated Non-Negated 
  Position 1 Position 2 Position 1 Position 2 
Region Measure M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Critical Gaze Duration (ms) 363 (16.1) 355 (14.5) 370 (15.5) 364 (14.7) 
Total Duration (ms) 456 (12.8)  434 (13.2) 463 (15.9) 443 (13.3) 
Regression Path Duration 
(ms) 
469 (27.6) 422 (21.1) 467 (25.9) 451 (20.5) 
First Pass Regression 
Ratio 
.165 (.024) .124 (.022) .154 (.024) .152 (.022) 
Postcritical Gaze Duration (ms) 339 (15.0) 352 (15.1) 344 (13.7) 348 (16.5) 
Total Duration (ms) 432 (15.7) 429 (14.8) 438 (15.1) 411 (14.4) 
Regression Path Duration 
(ms) 
450 (22.2) 460 (20.8) 474 (22.1) 471 (24.7) 
First Pass Regression 
Ratio 
.195 (.027) .249 (.030) .269 (.037) .290 (.036) 
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Figure 1. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at 
each noun.  
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Figure 2. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at 
each noun in the 0 ms delay condition.  
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Figure 3. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at 
each noun in the 500 ms delay condition.  
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Figure 4. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at 
each noun in the 1000 ms delay condition.  
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Figure 5. Negation effect for each noun at each delay condition in the subject analysis. 
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Figure 6. Total duration in the critical region for each position 
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Figure 7. Regression path duration in critical region for each position.  
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Figure 8. First pass regression ratios in the critical region for negated and non-negated 
nouns. 
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Figure 9. First pass regression ratios in the postcritical region for negated and non-
negated nouns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
